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Practical Side-Channel and Fault Injection Analysis on Lattice-Based Cryptography

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


IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE...

**QUANTUM
COMPUTER**

ECC

RSA



Security in Quantum Era: NIST PQC Call

- ❑ **National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)** initiated a standardization process for post-quantum cryptography (**PQC**) in November 2017.
- ❑ The first round had **69** candidates, second round had **26** candidates and the process is currently in its **third** and **final** round [AGJS+20].

Type	Signature	PKE/KEM	Finalist (Alternate)
Lattice Based	2	3 (2)	5 (2)
Code-Based	-	1 (2)	1 (2)
Multivariate	1 (1)	-	1 (1)
Hash-Based	- (2)	-	- (2)
Isogeny based	-	- (1)	- (1)
Others	-	-	- (0)
Total	3 (3)	4 (5)	7 (8)

Security in Quantum Era: NIST PQC Call


❑ Selection Criteria for Standardization Process:

- ❑ Theoretical Post-Quantum Security Guarantees
 - ❑ Implementation Performance (Speed, Area, latency, Power) on various HW/SW platforms
 - ❑ **Resistance against Side-Channel Attacks (SCA) and Fault Injection Attacks (FIA)**
- ❑ NIST explicitly states that “*encourages additional research regarding side-channel analysis*” of the finalist candidates and that it “*hopes to collect more information about the costs of implementing these algorithms in a way that provides resistance to such attacks*” [AGJS+20].




Main Focus:



Side-Channel Analysis (SCA)



Fault Injection Analysis (FIA)




Combined SCA and FIA



Research Outcomes

Lattice-based Cryptography




Main Contributions



Side-Channel Analysis (SCA)

- ❑ **Attack Scenario:** Chosen-Ciphertext Attacker (CCA)
- ❑ **Attack Target:** CCA secure PKE and KEMs for key recovery, message recovery
- ❑ *A Chosen Ciphertext Attacker in the presence of side-channels can perform a variety of message recovery and key recovery attacks.*



Side-Channel Analysis (SCA)


- ❑ **PC Oracle-based SCA** in LWE/LWR-based schemes (*TCHES 2020*):
 - ❑ Novel EM/power side-channel vulnerabilities to realize a PC Oracle
 - ❑ Key Recovery in a few thousand queries
 - ❑ No. of target schemes: **six (Kyber, Saber, Frodo, NewHope, Round5 and LAC)**
- ❑ **FD Oracle-based SCA** in LWE/LWR-based schemes (*IACR ePrint***):
 - ❑ Novel **single trace** message recovery attacks
 - ❑ Exploiting **Ciphertext Malleability** as a powerful tool to aid SCA
 - ❑ Break well-known shuffling and masking countermeasures
 - ❑ No. of target schemes: **six (Kyber, Saber, Frodo, NewHope, Round5 and LAC)**
 - ❑ First practical combined SCA and FIA over lattice-based schemes
- ❑ **PC and DF Oracle-based SCA** in NTRU-based schemes (*Third NIST PQC Conference*):
 - ❑ Target Scheme: Streamlined NTRU Prime
 - ❑ Key Recovery in a few thousand queries

** Under Submission



Side-Channel Analysis (SCA)

Side-Channel Assisted Chosen Ciphertext Attacks



Fault Injection Analysis (FIA)

- ❑ **Fault Injection Analysis:**
 - ❑ Forcing **Nonce-Misuse** through Faults (*COSADE 2019*):
 - ❑ First practical FIA (EM-based) over lattice-based schemes
 - ❑ No. of target schemes: **four** (Kyber, Dilithium, Frodo and NewHope)
 - ❑ Countermeasure incorporated into algorithmic specification of Frodo (Alternate Finalist)
 - ❑ Exploiting **Determinism** in Lattice-based Signatures (*AsiaCCS 2019*):
 - ❑ Fault Attack + Forgery using partial secret key recovery
 - ❑ First practical FIA (EM-based) over **two** signature schemes (Dilithium and qTESLA)



Implementations and Countermeasures

- ❑ Configurable SCA Countermeasures for Number Theoretic Transform (*SPACE 2020*):
 - ❑ Novel **masking** and **shuffling** countermeasures
 - ❑ Practical Implementation within Kyber and Dilithium on the ARM Cortex-M4
- ❑ Improving Speed of Dilithium's Signing Procedure (*CARDIS 2019*):
 - ❑ 8-35% improvement in signing speed of Dilithium on ARM Cortex-M4
- ❑ PQC Evaluation within Authentication Protocol in Automotive Context (*ISCAS 2020*):
 - ❑ Integration of lattice-based schemes within an authentication protocol LASAN.
 - ❑ Practical Evaluation on Automotive testbed based on ARM Cortex-R4 MCU (RTOS-based)
 - ❑ **Communication Bandwidth** is a main bottleneck in implementing PQC for automotive networks



“In a way, these things are like gold nuggets that God left in the forest. If I'm walking along in the forest and I stubbed my toe on it, who's to say I deserve credit for discovering it?”

-- Dr. Martin Hellman on the discovery of Public-Key Cryptography

Thank you!



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